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Indicators of central bank independence (CBI) based on the interpretation central bank 
laws in place may not capture the actual independence of the central bank. This paper 
develops an indicator of actual independence of the Bank Indonesia (BI), the central bank 
of Indonesia, for the period 1953-2008 and compares it with a new legal CBI indicator 
based on Cukierman (1992). The indicator of actual independence captures institutional 
and economic factors that affect CBI. We find that before 1999, legal and actual 
independence of BI diverged substantially. After a new central bank law was enacted, the 
legal independence of BI increased and converged to actual independence.  
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During the last two decades, many countries changed their central bank laws to grant 
their monetary authorities greater independence. Also the central bank of Indonesia 
(Bank Indonesia, BI) became more independent in 1999. It is widely believed that 
without sufficient independence, central banks will give in to pressure from politicians 
who may be motivated by short-run electoral considerations or may value short-run 
economic expansions highly while discounting the longer-run inflationary consequences 
of expansionary policies (Walsh, 2005).1 If the ability of politicians to distort monetary 
policy results in excessive inflation, countries with an independent central bank should 
experience lower rates of inflation.2  
 This paper assesses the independence of Bank Indonesia by constructing and 
comparing two measures of independence: a legal independence indicator and an actual 
independence indicator. Our main finding is that the actual independence of Bank 
Indonesia diverged from legal independence before the bank became legally independent 
in 1999. During this period, the actual independence of Bank Indonesia was higher than 
its legal independence. After the central bank law was changed in 1999, legal 
independence increased significantly and converged to actual independence.  
                                                 
1
 One theory underlying this view is the time inconsistency approach to monetary policy-making. The basic 
message of this theory is that government suffers from an inflationary bias and that, as a result, inflation is 
sub-optimal. Rogoff (1985) has shown that when monetary policy is delegated to an independent and 
‘conservative’ central banker, this inflationary bias will be reduced. Conservative means that the central 
banker is more averse to inflation than the government, in the sense that (s)he places a greater weight on 
price stability than the government does.  
2
 Indeed, empirical research focusing on the relationship between central bank independence (CBI) and 
inflation, suggests that average inflation is negatively related to measures of CBI (see Eijffinger and De 
Haan, 1996; Berger et al. 2001; and Crow and Meade, 2007 for summaries). 
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 Most empirical studies on central bank independence (CBI) use either an indicator 
based on central bank laws in place, or an indicator based on the so-called turnover rate 
of central bank governors. The most widely employed legal CBI index is from 
Cukierman (1992) and Cukierman et al. (1992)3, although alternative measures have been 
developed (see Arnone et al. 2006 for an extensive comparison of the various CBI 
indicators). A serious drawback of CBI indicators based on the central bank laws in place 
is that the interpretation of these laws is subjective because many central bank laws are 
incomplete and leave room for different interpretations (Berger et al., 2001). In addition, 
legal independence measures tend to be static and cannot capture institutional and 
economic factors that affect the actual independence of the central bank. Legal measures 
of CBI may therefore not reflect the true relationship between the central bank and the 
government. Especially in countries where the rule of law is less strongly embedded in 
the political culture, there can be wide gaps between the formal, legal institutional 
arrangements and their practical impact (Walsh, 2005). 
Cukierman (1992) and Cukierman et al. (1992) argue that the actual average term 
in office of the central bank governor may therefore be a better proxy for CBI than 
measures based on central bank laws. The turnover rate of central bank governors (TOR) is 
based on the presumption that, at least above some threshold, a higher turnover of central 
bank governors indicates a lower level of independence. However, a low TOR does not 
necessarily imply that the central bank is independent. It could reflect the presence of a 
subservient governor who tends to stay in office longer. Furthermore, also the TOR may 
not fully capture the institutional and economic changes, which affect central bank 
                                                 
3
 The only difference between the indicators of Cukierman (1992) and Cukierman et al. (1992) is the 
procedure employed to aggregate the various dimensions of CBI into one measure.  
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independence in practice. Cukierman (2007) therefore constructed an index of actual CBI 
by considering various economic and institutional aspects, such as financial market 
development, the size of government deficits, the type of exchange rate regime, and the 
function of the central bank as a development bank.  
 We extend both the legal CBI index constructed by Cukierman (1992) and the 
actual CBI index introduced by Cukierman (2007) in order to assess the independence of 
Bank Indonesia. First, in constructing the legal index we will add financial independence 
to the Cukierman legal index. Financial independence is defined as the ability of the 
central bank to attain its objective(s) efficiently without financial assistance from the 
government (Stella, 2005). In practice, financial independence is represented by a strong 
income position that provides the central bank with necessary means to obtain its 
objective(s) (see Cukierman, 2008; Jacome and Vazquez, 2008). The strength of central 
bank financial position is rarely discussed since theoretically central banks are assumed 
to have unlimited costless ability to meet their obligations, for instance by creating 
money. However, the assumption is not realistic as central banks can not both obtain its 
target and create money at the same time (see Stella, 2005). Therefore, considering 
financial independence becomes relevant in measuring central bank independence. 
Second, in measuring the actual independence of Bank Indonesia, we consider 
institutional and economic aspects that possibly affect each item of the legal CBI index of 
Cukierman (1992) and examine the implementation of the central bank law. By 
confronting both CBI measures, we are able to compare the legal and actual 
independence of Bank Indonesia, since its creation in 1953 until 2008.  
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 This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the methodology applied to 
construct the legal and the actual CBI indicators. Section 3 constructs the legal index of 
Cukierman (1992) for Bank Indonesia and compares it with legal indexes of other 
studies. This section also compares the legal independence of Bank Indonesia and central 
banks in other developing countries. Section 4 presents the extended legal index for Bank 
Indonesia, while section 5 constructs the actual CBI index for Bank Indonesia. Section 6 




In order to assess the degree of CBI of Bank Indonesia, we construct indicators of legal 
and actual independence. Our legal index for Bank Indonesia is based on Cukierman’s 
(1992) indicators. However, due to differences in interpretation of the various central 
bank laws in place our index differs from that of Cukierman. To minimize subjectivity 
and to check our interpretation of the laws in place, we interviewed staff of Bank 
Indonesia.4 Moreover, we compared our index with those of other studies that employ 
Cukierman’s (1992) methodology, like Polillo and Guillén (2005). In addition, in 
constructing the legal index for Bank Indonesia financial independence is included. As 
legal CBI indexes tend to be static and cannot capture the institutional and economic 
factors that affect the actual independence of a central bank, we construct an index of 
actual independence for Bank Indonesia following a similar approach as Cukierman 
(2007).  
                                                 
4
 The interviews were held in March 2009 in Bank Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia. We discussed the score of 
each component of our legal index with Bank Indonesia’s legal department.  
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The extended Cukierman index of legal CBI 
The index of Cukierman (1992) includes 16 components - each coded on scale of 0 
(lowest level of independence) to 1 (highest level of independence) - covering 4 main 
aspects of CBI: independence of the chief executive officer (CEO), independence in 
policy formulation, preference for low inflation, and absence of forced lending to the 
government. As outlined before, we add financial independence to the Cukierman legal 
index. Theoretically, central banks are assumed to have unlimited costless ability to meet 
their obligation, for instance by creating money. However, at the same time, in practice 
central banks should sacrifice their target of inflation.5 Moreover, when central banks 
experienced losses, they need recapitalization from the government to conduct monetary 
policy. It will reduce the independence of central banks from government or political 
interventions. Therefore, considering financial independence becomes relevant in 
measuring central bank independence. We consider three components of financial 
independence: determination of the central bank’s budget, decision-making on the 
allocation of central bank profits, and the responsibility of the central bank to bear its 
losses.  
 A central bank that has authority to determine its budget and profit allocation is 
considered to be financially independent and assigned the highest score (1). On the other 
hand, if government or parliament intervene, for instance because they have to approve 
the budget and profit allocation, the central bank is not financially independent and 
assigned the lowest score (0). With respect to losses, the highest score is given to central 
                                                 
5
 Central Bank of Argentina, central bank of Jamaica, and central bank of Uruguay are the examples of 
central banks which were experiencing losses with poor economic performances (see Stella, 2005).  
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banks that are responsible for their own losses without any assistance from the 
government. The lowest score is assigned to central banks requiring government’s 
assistance to recapitalize.  
 Since we add three components of financial independence to the Cukierman 
(1992) index, the total number of components is 19. Our overall index is the total score 
on these items divided by the total number of items. This implies that the weight of 
financial independence is 0.16 (3 items covering financial independence divided by 19). 
The weights of the other four main aspects of legal CBI are: independence of the CEO: 
0.21; independence in policy formulation: 0.16; preference for low inflation: 0.05; and 
absence of forced lending to the government: 0.42. Appendix A provides a detailed 
comparison of the extended legal index and the Cukierman (1992) index. 
 
A new index measuring actual independence 
We extend Cukierman’s (2007) approach to come up with an index of actual CBI by 
considering institutional and economic aspects that possibly affect each item of the legal 
CBI index of Cukierman (1992). Furthermore, we examine the implementation of central 
bank law in practice. Figure 1 show the information used to construct the actual index. 
The index also consists of 19 components covering the same five dimensions of CBI as 
the legal index discussed in the previous section. 
 The first dimension, independence of the CEO, is affected by the tenure of the 
CEO, the background of the CEO, the frequency of and grounds for dismissal, and other 
positions of the CEO. The item on the tenure of the CEO examines whether central bank 
governor turnover overlaps with executive change. It is closely related to the political 
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vulnerability of central banks introduced by Cukierman and Webb (1995). When the 
central bank governor is replaced within 1 month after the change of the executive, the 
central bank is not independent from political intervention. Regarding the background of 
CEO, we consider five possibilities: independent expert (highest score), central bank 
staff, central bank/government staff, government staff, and politician (lowest score). If 
the CEO keeps his position until the end of his legal term in office, the central bank is 
considered independent from political pressure. If the central bank governor is replaced 
frequently without clear reasons, the central bank is not independent. In between, we 
consider other reasons for dismissal (running from a high to a low score): resignation; 
poor performance; crime and corruption; reasons related to policy; and political 
participation. If the CEO of the central bank holds other positions, this may affect the 
independence of the central bank. For instance, if the CEO also has a position in 
government he will not be independent from political interests.  
 The second aspect of CBI is policy formulation. In practice, independence in 
formulating monetary policy is affected by institutional arrangements such as exchange 
rate regimes and capital mobility; bank supervision and the role as lender of last resort. 
Under a fixed exchange rate regime and perfect capital mobility, the central bank tries to 
maintain the exchange rate constant and minimize the difference between the domestic 
and foreign interest rates. In such a situation the central bank will be shielded from 
political pressure, as any deviation from the objective to keep the exchange rate fixed will 
be highly visible. In contrast, under a flexible exchange rate and perfect capital mobility, 
both the exchange rate and the interest rate are fully determined by the markets and this 
provides politicians with the opportunity to intervene in monetary policymaking.  
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 Moreover, independence in formulating monetary policy is affected if the central 
bank is responsible for banking supervision and has a role as lender of last resort (see 
Cukierman, 2007). A central bank, which is responsible for banking supervision, faces a 
trade-off in the short run between attaining financial market stability and price stability 
(see Noia and Giorgio, 1999; Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 1995). For instance, a high 
interest rate policy needed to maintain price stability will hurt the banking sector and 
increases the probability of bank failures. As lender of last resort, the central bank may 
need to inject liquidity at the risk of sacrificing price stability. Therefore, a central bank 
with responsibility for banking supervision and with a role as lender of last resort is not 
independent in formulating monetary policy. The final variable that may affect CBI is the 
role of the central bank in deciding on the assumptions underlying the government budget 
plans. If the central bank has no role to play, it is arguably not independent in formulating 
its monetary targets. 
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FIGURE 1 Legal and Actual Aspects of Central Bank Independence 
  
LEGAL ASPECTS     ACTUAL ASPECTS 
 
  
Chief executive officer (CEO) 
- The term in office of central 
bank CEO  
- Background of CEO 
- Dismissal 
- CEO has other positions  
Policy formulation 
Objectives 
- Exchange rate regime and 
capital mobility 
- Bank supervision and 
responsibility for bank failure 
- Decision on the target of 
exchange rate and inflation 
for government’s budget 
- Central bank as a 
development bank and 
granting credit at subsidy rate 
 
 
- Actual deficits (surplus)/GDP 
- Financial market 
development (M2/GDP) 
- Terms of lending 
- Potential borrowers from 
central bank 
- Limits on central bank 
lending 
- Maturity loans 
- Interest rate of bonds versus 
market rate 
- Income tax on government 
bonds transaction in primary 
market 
Limitations on lending to the 
government 
Financial Independence 
- Determination of central 
bank budget 
- Profits/Losses 
- Central bank capital  
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 The third dimension of CBI is the objective of monetary policy. In practice, CBI 
can be affected if the central bank functions as a development bank, as it will be more 
concerned with stimulating economic growth and employment than with maintaining 
price stability. Therefore, in constructing our actual CBI index, we assign the lowest 
score to a central bank that is heavily involved in granting subsidized credits to the 
private sector.  
 The next aspect of CBI refers to limitations on lending to the government. In 
practice, the likelihood that a central bank will provide credit to the government will 
depend on the magnitude of fiscal deficits and the degree of financial development (see 
Cukierman, 2007). The higher fiscal deficits are, the greater will be the likelihood that the 
central bank provides loans to the government. If financial markets are not well 
developed, the economy’s capacity to absorb government securities is limited. As pointed 
out by Sargent and Wallace (1981), the government may force the central bank to finance 
deficits if this maximum has been reached. Therefore, central bank lending to the 
government will be high if financial markets are less developed. We use the ratio of 
M2/GDP as an indicator of financial market development. The numerical scores for 
financial development are based on the quartile distribution of M2/GDP for all countries.6 
The final variable that we take up under this heading is taxes levied on government bonds 
transaction in primary market. If the government levies taxes on government bonds 
transaction in primary market, it will decrease the incentive of the central bank to buy 
governments securities in the primary market. This issue arose in Indonesia when the 
                                                 
6
 Data come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) data set.  
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Ministry of Finance levied income taxes on government bond transactions in the primary 
market of Bank Indonesia.7  
 Finally, we turn to financial independence. As suggested by Stella (2005), in 
order to be financially independent, a central bank requires a strong financial position. If 
a central bank does not have a strong financial position, it will be restricted to conduct 
monetary policies that will create losses but are needed to attain monetary objectives, 
such as open market operations and sterilization of foreign currency inflows (see Dalton 
and Dziobek, 2005). To measure financial independence, we consider the actual 
responsibility for decisions regarding the central bank budget and the distribution of 
central bank profits. The final variable related to financial independence in practice is the 
difference between actual and required capital. If the central bank’s capital is higher than 
required, the central bank is financially independent to conduct monetary policy. On the 
other hand, when the central bank’s capital is lower than required and it needs assistance 
from the government to improve its capital, the central bank is not financially 
independent. Appendix B provides the detailed components of the actual index in 






                                                 
7
 This policy had been conducted for two years (from 2006 until 2008). The income taxes on government 
bond transactions were only directed to Bank Indonesia. In 2008, a new tax law was enacted that implied 
that Bank Indonesia should not pay this tax anymore. The main reason for this change was to give 
incentives to Bank Indonesia to buy government bonds in the primary market.  
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LEGAL INDEPENDENCE OF BANK INDONESIA 
Cukierman (1992) index 
The legal index is constructed based on the interpretation of the central bank laws in 
place in Indonesia. Four central bank laws have been enacted between 1953, when Bank 
Indonesia was created, to the present time. The Act 11/1953 was created to nationalize 
the Javanese Bank, the former central bank before Indonesia became independent. The 
Act 11/1953 has been revised twice in order to relax the maximum amount of credit that 
Bank Indonesia could provide to the government. Due to those revisions the legal CBI 
index of Bank Indonesia decreased. Under President Soeharto, a new law (Act 13/1968) 
was introduced. This law has been in place for around 30 years. In 1999, Bank Indonesia 
was mandated as an independent institution by the new Act 23/1999. Because parliament 
wanted to curtail the independence of Bank Indonesia, the law was revised in 2004. 
Appendix C provides further details underlying the score for each component of the 
index under the various laws in place. 
 Legal independence of Bank Indonesia under Act 11/1953 (0.39) was higher than 
under Act 13/1968 (0.22). The new act reduced the independence of Bank Indonesia 
especially due to the relaxation of the provisions concerning credit to the government. 
Under Act 13/1968, there is no limit to provide credit to the government. Moreover, Bank 
Indonesia received a function as development bank. Table 1 shows the scores for the 
Cukierman (1992) index for legal independence of Bank Indonesia for the various laws in 
place. 
 Under Act 23/1999, the legal independence of Bank Indonesia increased 
significantly from 0.22 to 0.73. All components of the legal CBI index increased, except 
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for the item on the interest rate on loans to the government on which the law did not 
provide details. Based on the new law, Bank Indonesia was strictly prohibited to provide 
credit to the government and the private sector. In addition, Bank Indonesia became more 
independent as the central bank governor is appointed by parliament and not by the 
government, while maintaining price stability became the only objective of Bank 
Indonesia (see Alamsyah et al., 2001). However, as parliament considered Bank 
Indonesia as too independent, Act 23/1999 was replaced by Act 3/2004. Consequently, 
the legal independence of Bank Indonesia decreased to 0.63. Under Act 3/2004, Bank 
Indonesia is allowed to buy short-term government bonds in the primary market. This 
implies that Bank Indonesia can provide credit to the government.  
 
TABLE 1 Legal Independence Index of Bank Indonesia, 1953 -2008a 
No Description of variable The Act 11/1953 








The Act  
3/2004 
1 Chief executive officer (CEO) 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.36 0.71 0.71 
    Term in office 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
    Who appoints CEO 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.50 
    Dismissal 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.83 0.83 
    May CEO hold other offices in government? 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 
2 Policy formulation 0.27  0.27 0.27   0.27 0.75 0.75 
    Who formulates monetary policy? 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 1.00 1.00 
    Who has final word in resolution of conflict? 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 1.00 1.00 
    Role in the government's budgetary process 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
3 Objectives 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.60 0.60 
4 Limitation on lending to the government 0.46  0.50  0.46 0.09 0.81 0.57  
    Advances (limitation on non-securitized lending) 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.00 1.00 1.00 
    Securitized lending 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.67 
    Terms of lending (maturity, interest, amount) 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.33    1.00 0.33 
    Potential borrowers from the bank 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    Limits on central bank lending defined in 0.33 1.00 0.33 0.00 1.00   0.00 
    Maturity of loans 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 
    Interest rates on loans must be 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.75 
    
Prohibition from buying/selling government securities 
in the primary market 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Average Index 0.39 0.41 0.39 0.22 0.75 0.63 
a
 The legal independence index is constructed by interpreting the laws regarding Bank Indonesia in place in Indonesia 
Source: The Act 11/ 1953; the Act 11/1955; the Act 84/1958; the Act 13/1968; the Act 23/1999; the Act 3/2004 
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Our index compared with other similar legal CBI indicators 
This section compares our legal index of Bank Indonesia based on Cukierman (1992) 
with similar indicators as suggested by Cukierman et al. (1992), Polillo and Guillén 
(2005), and Ahsan et al. (2008). Polillo and Guillén (2005) employed the Cukierman 
(1992) method in constructing their legal index of CBI for several countries. Ahsan et al. 
(2008) used a different method, but some components of his index are comparable to the 
components of the Cukierman (1992) index. We use the time periods as suggested by 
Cukierman (1992), i.e., 1950-59; 1960-71; 1972-79; and 1980-89. In addition, we use the 
periods 1990-98, 1999-2003, and 2004-now. Table 2 shows a detailed comparison of our 
legal index of Bank Indonesia with those of the other studies.  
 It becomes clear that our legal index differs from the Cukierman et al. (1992) 
index. During the period of 1950-59, our legal index is higher. Some components, such as 
the final word in resolution of conflict; objectives; advance; and term of lending are 
assigned a higher score than in Cukierman et al. (1992). For instance, the Act 11/1953 
explicitly stated that in case there is disagreement between the government and the 
governor of Bank Indonesia on policy decision, government has a final word subject to 
possible protest by central bank governor. It implies that the governor of Bank Indonesia 
still has the right to propose his opinion in formulating monetary policy. Hence, we 
assigned a score of 0.2 for this sub-component rather than zero as in Cukierman et al. 
(1992). Moreover, for the component “objective”, Cukierman et al. (1992) assigned a 
score of 0, which means that price stability is not considered as an objective for monetary 
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policy. However, we assigned a score 0.4 for this component as under Act 11/1953 Bank 
Indonesia is responsible for price stability and credit development.  
 In addition, there is strange coding in the Cukierman index for the period 1960-
1971 during which there were two laws in place: the Act 84/1958 (revision of the Act 
11/1953) for the period 1960-1967 and the Act 13/1968 for the period 1968-1971. 
According to Cukierman’s method, whenever a change of law occurred twice within a 
decade, the classification was done in line with the legislation that was in effect during at 
least half of that decade. It means that during the period 1960-1971, the coding is based 
on Act 84/1958. As mentioned above, Act 84/1958 is just a revision of Act 11/1955; the 
only change being the limit of lending. However, the Cukierman score for the component 
“objective” the in period 1960-1971 increased from 0 in 1950-1959 to 0.4. This does not 
make much sense since there was no revision regarding this component in Act 84/1958.  
 The legal independence of Bank Indonesia significantly increased when the new 
Act 23/1999 was enacted. Our legal index during period 1999-2003 is 0.75. The index 
constructed by Polillo and Guillén (2005) is even higher (0.8). Unfortunately, we cannot 
make a detailed comparison for all components because Polillo and Guillén (2005) do not 
provide detailed information. In 2004, Act 23/1999 was replaced by Act 3/2004, which 
decreased independence due to a lower score for the component “limitation on lending”. 
Our scoring for the most recent law can be compared with some components that Ahsan 
et al. (2008) also included in his index. For dismissal, he assigned a score 0.5 while we 
gave a score of 0.83. Under Act 3/2004, the Governor of Bank Indonesia shall not be 
discharged during his term in office, unless he resigns or if there is evidence, which 
proves that he has committed a crime, or is permanently prevented from serving his 
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office. In our opinion, these provisions are not related to policy, hence, the score for 
dismissal is 0.83. The score for the component “objective” is also different from Ahsan’s. 
For this component, we assign a score of 0.6 since the Act states that the objective of the 














 TABLE 2 Our Legal Index Compared with Other Legal CBI Indicators for Bank Indonesiaa 
a A blank cell indicates the data is not available for that year 
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1 Chief executive officer (CEO)                         
    Term of office 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50  0.50 0.50 
    Who appoints CEO 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.50  0.50 0.50 
    Dismissal 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.83   0.83 0.50 
    
May CEO hold other offices in 
government? 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 1.00   1.00 1.00 
2 Policy formulation                         
    Who formulates monetary policy? 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 1.00   1.00 1.00 
    
Who has final word in resolution of 
conflict? 0.20 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 1.00   1.00 1.00 
    
Role in the government's budgetary 
process 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   0.00   
3 Objectives 0.40 0.00 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.60   0.60 0.80 
4 Limitation on lending to the government                        
    
Advances (limitation on non-
securitized lending) 0.67 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00   1.00  
    Securitized lending 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00   0.67  
    
Terms of lending (maturity, 
interest, amount) 0.67 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 1.00   0.33  
    Potential borrowers from the bank 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00   0.00  
    
Limits on central bank lending 
defined in 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.33 1.00   0.00  
    Maturity of loans 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.33 0.00   0.67  
    Interest rates on loans must be 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.25   0.75  
    
Prohibition from buying/selling 
government securities in the 
primary market 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00   0.00  
Average Index 0.39 0.24 0.39 0.30 0.22 0.27 0.22 0.27 0.75 0.80 0.63  
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Bank Indonesia compared to central banks in other developing countries 
Table 3 shows the legal independence of various central banks in developing countries. In 
the first three decades, most central banks received a low score on the Cukierman index 
of legal independence (below 0.5). During 1972-1989, Bank Indonesia is less 
independent compared to most central banks in other developing countries, although the 
index of central banks in some countries (like Brazil, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, and 
Panama) is even lower. In the 1990s, various countries (like Argentina, Chile, Mexico, 
Peru and Venezuela) amended their central bank laws thereby increasing legal 
independence. After the new Act 23/1999 was introduced, the legal CBI index of Bank 
Indonesia increased significantly to 0.75, the second highest score. Only the central bank 
of Chile surpassed BI.  
 
TABLE 3 Legal Independence of Bank Indonesia and Various Other Central Banks 
in Developing Countries 
Based on Cukierman's Index Based on Polillo & Guillén Index Countries 
1950-1959 1960-1971 1972-1979 1980-1989 1990-1998 1999-2000 
Argentina      0.40 0.40 0.74 0.74 
Bolivia  0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.63 
Botswana    0.33 0.33 0.33 0.45 
Brazil   0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 
Chile 0.26 0.26 0.46 0.46 0.77 0.77 
China 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 
Colombia  0.27 0.27 0.27 0.44 0.44 
Costa Rica  0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.61 
Egypt  0.52 0.52 0.49 0.49 0.55 0.55 
Ethiopia    0.40 0.40 0.44 0.44 
Honduras  0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.55 
India  0.25 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 
Indonesiaa 0.39 0.39 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.75 
Kenya   0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.50 
Malaysia   0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 
Mexico  0.25 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.56 0.56 
Morocco  0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
Nepal  0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 
Nigeria   0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 
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Pakistan  0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 
Panama  0.24 0.24 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 
Peru   0.43 0.43 0.43 0.74 0.74 
Philippines 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.48 0.48 
South Africa 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.48 
Thailand  0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27   
Uruguay  0.22 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.54 
Venezuela  0.28 0.28 0.43 0.43 0.63 0.63 
aThe legal index for Indonesia is based on our index in table 2  
Sources: Cukierman et al. (1992); Polillo and Guillén (2005) 
 
THE EXTENDED LEGAL INDEX FOR BANK INDONESIA 
We extend the Cukierman (1992) legal index by including financial independence 
proxied by responsibilities for (decisions on) the central bank’s budget, the allocation of 
the central bank’s profit, and the central bank’s losses. Table 4 presents the extended 
legal index. Appendix A provides details for each component of the index. In this section 
we motivate our scores for financial independence. 
 Under the Act 11/1953 and the Act 13/1968, the central bank budget is proposed 
by the board of governors of Bank Indonesia and should be approved by the government. 
It implies that decisions on the central bank budget are taken by the central bank and the 
executive. Hence, we assign a score of 0.5 for the first component of financial 
independence. The score increased to the highest score 1, since Act 23/1999 stipulates 
that the central bank’s budget is formulated by the central bank’s governor without 
approval from the executive or legislative. After the Act 23/1999 was revised, the score 
for this component decreased as the new Act requires the legislative’s approval of the 
operational budget. As a result, we assigned a score of 0.5.  
 The second component of financial independence refers to the allocation of the 
central bank’s profits. Under Act 11/1953, it is up to BI to decide on the allocation of its 
profits and we therefore assigned the highest score. Under Act 13/1968, the allocation of 
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the central bank’s profit is decided upon by the central bank and the government. 
Consequently, the score for this component decreased to 0.5. However, according to Act 
23/1999 and Act 3/2004, profits of BI should be transferred to the central bank’s reserves 
until the solvency requirement is fulfilled. The rest of the profits should be transferred to 
the government. Thus, we assigned the highest score for this component.  
 The final component of financial independence is responsibility for the central 
bank’s losses. If the law foresees that the government finances or recapitalizes the central 
bank when it experiences losses, the central bank will not be financially independent 
from political intervention. Under Act 11/1953 and Act 13/1968, BI was responsible for 
its losses by using its own reserves without any assistance from the government, so that 
we assigned the highest score. In contrast, Act 23/1999 and Act 3/2004 foresee that if 
central bank capital is lower than required, the government should recapitalize the bank 
by issuing bonds. If capital is higher than required, the central bank is responsible for its 
losses by using its reserves. Hence, we assigned a score of 0.5 for this component.  
 Including financial independence into the Cukierman’s (1992) legal index 
components affects the overall legal index of Bank Indonesia. As we can see that the 
extended legal index of Bank Indonesia in table 4 is higher than the legal index of Bank 
Indonesia in table 1.  
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TABLE 4 The Extended Legal Independence Index for Bank Indonesia 











1 Chief executive officer (CEO) 0.31  0.31  0.31  0.36  0.71  0.71  
    Term of office 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
    Who appoints CEO 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.50 
    Dismissal 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.83 0.83 
    May CEO hold other offices in government? 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 
2 Policy formulation  0.27 0.27  0.27 0.27 0.75  0.75  
    Who formulates monetary policy? 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 1.00 1.00 
    Who has final word in resolution of conflict? 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 1.00 1.00 
    Role in the government's budgetary process 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
3 Objectives 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.60 0.60 
4 Limitation on lending to the government 0.46  0.50  0.46  0.09   0.81 0.57  
    Advances (limitation on non-securitized lending) 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.00 1.00 1.00 
    Securitized lending 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 
    Terms of lending (maturity, interest, amount) 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.33 1.00 0.33 
    Potential borrowers from the bank 1.00 0.67 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    Limits on central bank lending defined in 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.00 
    Maturity of loans 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 
    Interest rates on loans must be 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.75 
    Central bank prohibited from buying or selling 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
     Government securities in the primary market?             
5 Financial Autonomy 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.67 0.83 0.67 
  
  
Determination of the central bank's budget 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.50 
  
  
Determination of  the allocation of bank 
profits 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 
  
  
Who is responsible for central bank losses 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 
Average 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.28 0.77 0.65 
a
 The extended legal independence index is constructed by adding additional aspect of independence, the so-called 
financial autonomy  
 
Sources: The Act 11/ 1953; the Act 11/1955; the Act 84/1958; the Act 13/1968; the Act 23/1999; the Act 3/2004 
 
THE ACTUAL INDEPENDENCE OF BANK INDONESIA 
This section presents an indicator of the actual independence of Bank Indonesia. Details 
are presented in Table 5. It becomes clear that actual independence of BI varies over 
time. The lowest level of actual independence occurred during the period 1959-1965. 
During this period, three components of the index of actual independence (term in office 
of the CEO, objectives, and limitation on lending) received a low score compared to other 
periods.  
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 Between 1959 and 1965, the turnover of most central bank governors overlapped 
(within 0-1 month) with a change of the executive. In addition, there were three 
dismissals of the governor during this period. Two of those dismissals (Soetikno Slamet 
in 1960 and Soemarno in 1963) were without a clear reason. In addition, Jusuf Muda 
Dalam, the fifth governor of Bank Indonesia, had a background as a politician. Therefore, 
the score for the component “background of the governor” is very low in this period. 
Furthermore, Bank Indonesia played an important role as a development bank providing 
(subsidized) credits to the private sector. Finally, large fiscal deficits (exceeding 6 % of 
GDP) and a low level of financial development (M2/GDP was less than 7%) further 
reduced the actual independence of Bank Indonesia.  
 In contrast, the average score for policy formulation components in the period 
1959-1965 was relatively high. The change from a flexible to a fixed exchange rate 
system and the delegation of banking supervision from Bank Indonesia to a new ministry 
increased the actual independence in policy formulation (see Rahardjo, 1995).8 In 1963, 
government relaxed the regulation requiring exporters to report all of their foreign 








                                                 
8
 A multiple exchange rate system was adopted in 1957 and the Governor of Bank Indonesia became 
member of the cabinet. In addition, banking supervision responsibility was delegated to a new ministry, the 
so-called the Ministry of Banking and Private Sectors Regulation (see also Bank Indonesia, 2005 and Bank 
Indonesia, 2006) 
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TABLE 5 Actual Independence Index of Bank Indonesia, 1953-2008a 
 













1 Chief executive officer (CEO) 0.77 0.56 0.68 0.62 0.91 0.79 
    Tenure of CEO 0.92 0.50 0.35 0.00 1.00 1.00 
    Background of CEO 0.29 0.18 0.51 0.52 0.65 0.25 
    Dismissal 0.86 0.69 0.95 0.96 1.00 0.90 
    CEO holds other offices 1.00 0.86 0.88 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2 Policy formulation 0.14 0.38 0.25 0.20 0.50 0.25 
    Exchange rate regime and capital mobility 0.56 0.67 1.00 0.81 0.00 0.00 
    Banking supervision and funding for bank failure 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 
    Decision on inflation and exchange rate target 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
3 Objective: Function as a development bank& credit subsidy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.52 1.00 1.00 
4 Limitation on lending to the government 0.44 0.33 0.39 0.56 0.60 0.56 
    Actual deficits(surplus)/GDP 0.61 0.28 0.55 0.71 0.74 0.67 
    Financial market development 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.61 0.80 0.75 
    Terms of lending (maturity, interest, amount) 0.67 0.67 0.37 0.33 0.00 0.00 
    Potential borrowers from the bank 0.50 0.50 0.06 0.03 0.50 0.50 
    Limits on central bank lending defined in 0.50 0.50 0.06 0.03 0.50 0.50 
    Maturity of loans 0.33 0.33 0.65 0.67 0.67 0.67 
    Interest rates on loans 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.75 0.75 
    Tax on primary market transaction 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 
5 Financial Independence  0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 1.00 0.77 
  
  Determination of central bank's budgets 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.50 
  
  Profits/Losses 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 
  
  The actual capital of central bank 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
  Actual independence of Bank Indonesia 0.54 0.47 0.51 0.60 0.78 0.66 
a
 The actual index is constructed based on the indicators of the actual independence in appendix B 
 
Sources: Bank Indonesia (2005); Bank Indonesia (2006); Bank Indonesia (1953-2008); International Financial 
Statistics (IFS); World Development Indicators (WDI); Rahardjo (1995) 
 
 
 The index of actual independence of Bank Indonesia increased during consecutive 
periods until 2003. During the period 1966-1982, known as the period of stabilization and 
rehabilitation, the components “background of the CEO” and “dismissal” contributed 
significantly to the increase of actual independence. The governor during this period 
(Rachmat Saleh) was from Bank Indonesia. Moreover, all governors were in office until 
the end of their legal term in office, while the improvement of the public finances and the 
fast financial development increased the independence of Bank Indonesia in practice.  
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 The next period, 1983-1998, during which the government liberalized policies, 
various components of the index of actual independence (notably objectives and 
limitation on lending to government) increased significantly. The maximum on interest 
rate was abolished. The real interest rate was positive in this period. Moreover, in 1990 
Bank Indonesia restricted its credits to the private sector, while fiscal deficits were 
reduced and financial markets developed further, triggered by the deregulation policies 
conducted by the government in the 1980s. The deregulation in the banking sector aimed 
to attract both domestic and foreign investors and to mobilize domestic savings for 
financing economic development.  
 The actual independence of Bank Indonesia reached the highest level during 
1999-2003, when the central bank was legally mandated as an independent institution. 
All the components of the index of actual independence increased during this period. The 
component “policy formulation” increased significantly as Bank Indonesia introduced an 
inflation targeting policy in 1999. In addition, even though Bank Indonesia remained 
responsible for banking supervision, the costs of the banking crisis burdened the 
government’s budget. For instance, in the banking crisis in 1998 liquidity support was 
provided by the government rather than Bank Indonesia. Moreover, in 2004, the Deposit 
Insurance Agency (DIA) was officially established to guarantee private savings in the 
banking sector (see Siregar and James, 2006).9 Due to those institutional changes, Bank 
Indonesia faces less of a trade off between attaining inflation stability and maintaining 
financial stability in the short run. Concerning financial independence, Bank Indonesia 
                                                 
9
 DIA is an independent institution, which was established with a paid-up capital of Rp 4 trillion. The new 
deposit insurance scheme covers deposits of up to only Rp 5 billion by March 2006. The ceiling was 
reduced to Rp 2 billion in September 2006, and finally be reduced to Rp 100 million by March 2007 (see 
Siregar and James, 2006) 
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could determine its budget solely without any interventions from government or 
parliament.  
 However, actual independence of Bank Indonesia decreased during 2004-2008 
because of several factors. During this period, both governors (Burhanuddin Abdullah 
and Boediono) had a background as a former minister of economy. In addition, the 
dismissal of governor Burhanuddin Abdullah due to corruption reduced the actual 
independence of BI. Related to policy formulation, government decided on the inflation 
and exchange rate assumptions underlying the government budget plans. Moreover, the 
elimination of the tax on the primary government bond market transactions of BI 
increased the attractiveness for the central bank to buy government bonds in the primary 
market. Finally, since 2004 BI could no longer determine its budget solely as approval by 
the legislative was required.  
 
LEGAL VERSUS ACTUAL INDEPENDENCE OF BANK INDONESIA 
Figure 2 shows that the actual and legal independence of Bank Indonesia diverged 
notably during the period 1968-1998. Under Act 13/1968, the legal independence 
dropped while actual independence increased. In fact, the index of actual independence 
was significantly higher than the legal index in this period. Several factors, like the 
improvement of the government’s fiscal position and the development of financial 
markets, decreased the pressure on Bank Indonesia to provide credit to the government, 
be it directly or indirectly. Also other factors, like the background of governors (mostly 
coming from Bank Indonesia) and the absence of dismissals, contributed to the 
divergence of the actual index from the legal index. Interestingly, these developments 
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occurred under the authoritarian Soeharto regime. After 1999, when the central bank was 
mandated as an independent institution, the legal index increased significantly and 
converged to the actual index.  
 Looking at each group of components, prior to 1999 the actual independence of 
the CEO is generally higher than the legal index would suggest. Only in 1963, the actual 
index of CEO is significantly lower than the legal index of CEO because the governor of 
Bank Indonesia at that time, Jusuf Muda Dalam, belongs to one a political party. 
Moreover, the actual index of CEO during the period 1953-1967 was volatile because the 
central bank governor turnover rate was very high. Due to the introduction of a flexible 
exchange rate regime in 1998, the actual independence of Bank Indonesia in formulating 
monetary policy dropped to the lowest level. After Bank Indonesia was prohibited to 
provide credits to the private sector in 1999, the actual index of objectives is higher than 
the legal index. In addition, the legal index of lending limits tended to converge to the 
actual index after Bank Indonesia was mandated as independent institution. The actual 
index of financial independence decreased significantly in 2007, because Bank Indonesia 














                                                 
10
 Based on the annual reports of Bank Indonesia, 1953-2008. 
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Indicators of CBI based the interpretation of the central bank law in place may be 
unreliable in measuring the independence of the central bank in practice. Moreover, legal 
independence measures tend to be static and cannot capture institutional and economic 
factors that affect the actual independence of the central bank. Therefore, this paper not 
only develops legal indicators of the independence of Bank Indonesia (BI) for the period 
1953-2008 by extending the legal CBI constructed by Cukierman (1992), but also 
introduces an index for the actual independence of BI, extending the approach suggested 
by Cukierman (2007).  
 In constructing the legal index we add financial independence of central bank to 
the index of Cukierman (1992). Financial independence is defined as the ability of the 
central bank to attain its objective(s) efficiently without financial assistance from the 
government. To measure actual independence, we consider institutional and economic 
factors that affect the independence of Bank Indonesia, such as the exchange rate regime 
and capital mobility; central bank as development bank; fiscal deficits; and the degree of 
financial market development. We also consider other factors that may affect actual 
independence, like the background of the governors and the reasons for their dismissal.  
 We find that before 1999 (during the Soeharto era), the legal and actual 
independence of BI diverged substantially. The actual independence of Bank Indonesia is 
much higher than its legal independence during that period. A good background of the 
governors, no dismissal, the improvement of fiscal deficits, the development of financial 
market, and the deregulation of economy are amongst the factors increasing the actual 
independence of Bank Indonesia. After Bank Indonesia was mandated as a legally 
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independent institution by a new central bank law, the legal independence of BI increased 
and converged to the actual independence. All aspects of legal CBI increased 
significantly, especially the independence in monetary formulation and the absence of 
forced lending to the government.  
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Appendix A The Legal Index of Cukierman (1992) and The Extended Legal Index 
Cukierman Index  The Extended Index  
Variabl
e 












1 Chief executive officer (CEO) 0.2   1 Chief executive officer (CEO) 0.21   
    Term of office 0.25       Term of office 0.25   
    Over 8 years  1     Over 8 years  1 
    6 to 8 years  0.75     6 to 8 years  0.75 
    5 years  0.5     5 years  0.5 
    4 years  0.25     4 years  0.25 
    Under 4 years or at the discretion of appointer  0     Under 4 years or at the discretion of appointer  0 
    Who appoints CEO 0.25       Who appoints CEO 0.25   
    Board of central bank  1     Board of central bank  1 
    A council of the central bank board, executive  0.75     A council of the central bank board, executive  0.75 
    branch, and legislative branch        branch, and legislative branch    
    Legislature  0.5     Legislature  0.5 
    Executive collectively (e.g. council of ministers)  0.25     Executive collectively (e.g. council of ministers)  0.25 
    One or two members of the executive branch  0     One or two members of the executive branch  0 
    Dismissal 0.25       Dismissal 0.25   
    No provision for dismissal  1     No provision for dismissal  1 
    Only for reasons not related to policy  0.83     Only for reasons not related to policy  0.83 
    At the discretion of central bank board  0.67     At the discretion of central bank board  0.67 
    At legislature's discretion  0.5     At legislature's discretion  0.5 
    Unconditional dismissal possible by legislature  0.33     Unconditional dismissal possible by legislature  0.33 
    At executive's discretion  0.17     At executive's discretion  0.17 
    Unconditional dismissal possible by executive  0     Unconditional dismissal possible by executive  0 
    May CEO hold other offices in government? 0.25       May CEO hold other offices in government? 0.25   
    No  1     No  1 
    Only with permission of the executive branch  0.5     Only with permission of the executive branch  0.5 
    No rule against CEO holding another office  0     No rule against CEO holding another office  0 
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2 Policy formulation 0.15   2 Policy formulation 0.16   
    Who formulates monetary policy 0.25       Who formulates monetary policy 0.25   
    Bank alone  1     Bank alone  1 
    Bank participates, but has little influence  0.67     Bank participates, but has little influence  0.67 
    Bank only advises government  0.33     Bank only advises government  0.33 
    Bank has no say  0     Bank has no say  0 
    Who has final word in resolution of conflict? 0.5       Who has final word in resolution of conflict? 0.5   
    The bank, on issues clearly defined in the law as   1     The bank, on issues clearly defined in the law as   1 
    its objectives        its objectives    
    Government, only policy issues not clearly defined  0.8     Government, only policy issues not clearly defined  0.8 
    as the bank's goals or in case of conflict        as the bank's goals or in case of conflict    
    within bank        within bank    
    A council of the central bank, executive branch,  0.6     A council of the central bank, executive branch,  0.6 
    and legislative branch        and legislative branch    
    The legislature, on policy issues  0.4     The legislature, on policy issues  0.4 
    The executive branch on policy issues, subject to  0.2     The executive branch on policy issues, subject to  0.2 
    due process and possible protest by the bank        due process and possible protest by the bank    
    The executive branch has unconditional priority  0     The executive branch has unconditional priority  0 
    Role in the government's budgetary process 0.25       Role in the government's budgetary process 0.25   
    Central bank active  1     Central bank active  1 
    Central bank has no influence  0     Central bank has no influence  0 
3 Objectives 0.15   3 Objectives 0.05   
   Price stability is the major or only objective in  1    Price stability is the major or only objective in  1 
    the charter, and the central bank has the final         the charter, and the central bank has the final     
    word in case of conflict with other government        word in case of conflict with other government    
    objectives        Objectives    
   Price stability is the only objective  0.8    Price stability is the only objective  0.8 
   Price stability is one goal, with other compatible  0.6    Price stability is one goal, with other compatible  0.6 
    objectives, such as a stable banking system        objectives, such as a stable banking system    
   Price stability is one goal, with potentially conflicting  0.4    Price stability is one goal, with potentially conflicting  0.4 
    objectives, such as full employment        objectives, such as full employment    
   No objectives stated in the bank charter  0.2    No objectives stated in the bank charter  0.2 
      0     Stated objectives do not include price stability   0 
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4 Limitation on lending to the government 0.50   4 Limitation on lending to the government 0.42   
    
Advances (limitation on non-securitized 
lending) 0.3       Advances (limitation on non-securitized lending) 0.3   
    No advances permitted  1     No advances permitted  1 
    Advances permitted, but with strict limit (e.g.,  0.67     Advances permitted, but with strict limit (e.g.,  0.67 
    up to 15 % of government revenue)        up to 15 % of government revenue)    
    Advances permitted, and the limits are loose  0.33     Advances permitted, and the limits are loose  0.33 
    (e.g., over 15 % of government revenue)        (e.g., over 15 % of government revenue)    
    No legal limits on lending  0     No legal limits on lending  0 
    Securitized lending 0.2       Securitized lending 0.2   
    Not permitted  1     Not permitted  1 
    Permitted, but with strict limit (e.g., up to 15   0.67     Permitted, but with strict limit (e.g., up to 15   0.67 
    % of government revenue)        % of government revenue)    
    Permitted, and the limits are loose (e.g., over 15  0.33     Permitted, and the limits are loose (e.g., over 15  0.33 
    % of government revenue)        % of government revenue)    
    No legal limits on lending  0     No legal limits on lending  0 
    Terms of lending (maturity, interest, amount) 0.2       Terms of lending (maturity, interest, amount) 0.2   
    Controlled by the bank  1     Controlled by the bank  1 
    Specified by the bank charter  0.67     Specified by the bank charter  0.67 
    Agreed between the central bank and executive  0.33     Agreed between the central bank and executive  0.33 
    Decided by the executive branch alone  0     Decided by the executive branch alone  0 
    Potential borrowers from the bank 0.1       Potential borrowers from the bank 0.1   
    Only the central government  1     Only the central government  1 
    All levels of government (state as well as central)  0.67     All levels of government (state as well as central)  0.67 
    Those mentioned above and public enterprises  0.33     Those mentioned above and public enterprises  0.33 
    Public and private sector  0     Public and private sector  0 
    Limits on central bank lending defined in 0.05       Limits on central bank lending defined in 0.05   
    Currency amounts  1     Currency amounts  1 
    Shares of central bank demand liabilities or capital  0.67     Shares of central bank demand liabilities or capital  0.67 
    Shares of government revenue  0.33     Shares of government revenue  0.33 
    Share of government expenditures  0     Share of government expenditures  0 
    Maturity of loans 0.05       Maturity of loans 0.05   
    Within 6 months  1     Within 6 months  1 
    Within 1 year  0.67     Within 1 year  0.67 
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    More than 1 year  0.33     More than 1 year  0.33 
    No mention of maturity in the law  0     No mention of maturity in the law  0 
    Interest rates on loans must be 0.05       Interest rates on loans must be 0.05   
    Above minimum rates  1     Above minimum rates  1 
    At market rates  0.75     At market rates  0.75 
    Below maximum rates  0.5     Below maximum rates  0.5 
    Interest rate is not mentioned  0.25     Interest rate is not mentioned  0.25 
    No interest on government borrowing from the  0     No interest on government borrowing from the  0 
    central bank        central bank    
    Central bank prohibited from buying or selling 0.05       Central bank prohibited from buying or selling 0.05   
    Government securities in the primary market?        Government securities in the primary market?    
    Yes  1     Yes  1 
    No   0     No   0 
       5 Financial Independence 0.16   
          Determination of the central bank's budget 0.33   
          Mostly central bank  1 
          
Mixture of bank and executive or legislative 
branches  0.5 
          Mostly executive or legislative branches  0 
              
          Determination of  the allocation of bank profits 0.33   
          Mostly by bank or fixed by law  1 
          
Mixture of bank and executive or legislative 
branches  0.5 
          Mostly executive or legislative branches  0 
              
          Who is responsible for central bank losses 0.33   
          Central Bank is fully responsible   1 
          
At certain capital limit, government should 
capitalize the central bank 
 0.5 
          Government  0 





Appendix B The Index of Legal Independence vs. The Index of Actual Independence 

















1 Chief executive officer (CEO) 0.21   1 Chief executive officer (CEO) 0.21   
    Term of office 0.25       Overlap with Government's change  0.25   
    Over 8 years   1     10 months or more   1 
    6 to 8 years   0.75     7-9 months   0.75 
    5 years   0.5     4-6 months   0.5 
    4 years   0.25     2-3 months   0.25 
    Under 4 years or at the discretion of appointer   0     0-1 month   0 
    Who appoints CEO 0.25       Background of CEO 0.25   
    Board of central bank   1     Independent expert   1 
    A council of the central bank board, executive   0.75     Central bank staff   0.75 
    branch, and legislative branch         Mix between ex- government and central bank staff    0.5 
    Legislature   0.5     Government staff   0.25 
    Executive collectively (e.g. council of ministers)   0.25     Politician   0 
    One or two members of the executive branch   0           
    Dismissal 0.25       Dismissal 0.25   
    No provision for dismissal   1     No dismissal   1 
    Only for reasons not related to policy   0.83     Resignation and permanently prevented   0.83 
    At the discretion of central bank board   0.67     
Poor performance (for instance inflation target is not 
attained)   0.67 
    At legislature's discretion   0.5     Crime and corruption   0.5 
    Unconditional dismissal possible by legislature   0.33     Related to policy causing central bank loss   0.33 
    At executive's discretion   0.17     Political participation   0.17 
    Unconditional dismissal possible by executive   0     Without a clear reason   0 
    May CEO hold other offices in government? 0.25       CEO holds other office? 0.25   
 38 
    No   1     No other position   1 
    Only with permission of the executive branch   0.5      Private sector position   0.5 
    No rule against CEO holding another office   0      Government &Political Position   0 
2 Policy formulation 0.16   2 Policy formulation 0.16   
    Who formulates monetary policy 0.25       Exchange rate regime & capital mobility 0.25   
    Bank alone   1     Fixed exchange rate, perfect capital mobility  1 
    Bank participates, but has little influence   0.67     Fixed exchange rate, imperfect capital mobility  0.67 
    Bank only advises government   0.33     Flexible exchange rate, imperfect capital mobility  0.33 
    Bank has no say   0     Flexible exchange rate, perfect capital mobility  0 
    Who has final word in resolution of conflict? 0.5       
Banking supervision and sources of funding for 
bank failure 0.5   
    The bank, on issues clearly defined in the law as    1     
Central bank not as banking supervision and not 
responsible for the cost of bank failure 
 1 
    its objectives         
Central bank as a bank supervision and 
government/independent institution is responsible for 
the cost of bank failure  0.5 
    Government, only policy issues not clearly defined   0.8     
Central bank as a bank supervision and responsible for 
the cost of bank failure  0 
    as the bank's goals or in case of conflict              
    within bank              
    A council of the central bank, executive branch,   0.6          
    and legislative branch              
    The legislature, on policy issues   0.4          
    The executive branch on policy issues, subject to   0.2          
    due process and possible protest by the bank              
    The executive branch has unconditional priority   0          
    Role in the government's budgetary process 0.25       
Decision on the target of exchange rate and 
inflation for government's budget 0.25   
    Central bank active   1     Independently by central bank  1 
    Central bank has no influence   0     Jointly with government  0.5 
             By government only  0 
3 Objectives 0.05   3 Objectives 0.05   
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   Price stability is the major or only objective in   1     
Function as a development bank, granting credit at 
subsidy rates? 
   
    the charter, and the central bank has the final          No  1 
    word in case of conflict with other government         To some extent  0.66 
    objectives         Yes  0.33 
   Price stability is the only objective   0.8     
The central bank heavily involved in granting 
subsidized credits  0 
   Price stability is one goal, with other compatible   0.6           
    objectives, such as a stable banking system               
   Price stability is one goal, with potentially conflicting   0.4           
    objectives, such as full employment               
   No objectives stated in the bank charter   0.2           
    Stated objectives do not include price stability   0             
4 Limitation on lending to the government 0.42   4 Limitation on lending to the government 0.5   
    Advances (limitation on non-securitized lending) 0.3       Actual deficits (surplus)/GDP 0.3   
    No advances permitted   1     Surplus  1 
    Advances permitted, but with strict limit (e.g.,   0.67     0<deficits=<3%  0.67 
    up to 15 % of government revenue)         3%<deficits=<6%  0.33 
    Advances permitted, and the limits are loose   0.33     Deficits>6%  0 
    (e.g., over 15 % of government revenue)              
    No legal limits on lending   0          
    Securitized lending 0.2       Financial market development (M2/GDP) 0.2   
    Not permitted   1     M2/GDP>52%  1 
    Permitted, but with strict limit (e.g., up to 15    0.67     52%>=M2/GDP>32%  0.75 
    % of government revenue)         32%>=M2/GDP>20%  0.5 
    Permitted, and the limits are loose (e.g., over 15   0.33     20%>=M2/GDP>7%  0.25 
    % of government revenue)         7%>=M2/GDP  0 
    No legal limits on lending   0          
    Terms of lending (maturity, interest, amount) 0.2       Terms of lending (maturity, interest, amount) 0.2   
    Controlled by the bank   1     Controlled by the bank  1 
    Specified by the bank charter   0.67     Follow the law  0.67 
    Agreed between the central bank and executive   0.33     Agreed between the central bank and executive  0.33 
    Decided by the executive branch alone   0     Decided by the executive branch alone  0 
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    Potential borrowers from the bank 0.1       Potential borrowers from the bank 0.1   
    Only the central government   1     100% claim on government  1 
    All levels of government (state as well as central)   0.67     
Claim on government> claim on private (include 
bank)  0.5 
    Those mentioned above and public enterprises   0.33     
Claim on government < claim on private (include 
bank) 
 0 
    Public and private sector   0          
    Limits on central bank lending defined in 0.05       Limits on central bank lending defined in 0.05   
    Currency amounts   1     Currency amounts  1 
    Shares of central bank demand liabilities or capital   0.67     Shares of central bank demand liabilities or capital  0.67 
    Shares of government revenue   0.33     Shares of government revenue  0.33 
    Share of government expenditures   0     Share of government expenditures  0 
    Maturity of loans 0.05       Maturity of loans 0.05   
    Within 6 months   1     Within 6 months  1 
    Within 1 year   0.67     Within 1 year  0.67 
    More than 1 year   0.33     More than 1 year  0.33 
    No mention of maturity in the law   0     Longer period by extension  0 
    Interest rates on loans must be 0.05       Interest rate of loans vs market rate 0.05   
    Above minimum rates   1     Interest on loans>market rate  1 
    At market rates   0.75     Interest on loans=market rate  0.75 
    Below maximum rates   0.5     Interest on loans<market rate  0.5 
    Interest rate is not mentioned   0.25     Interest rate is not mentioned  0.25 
    No interest on government borrowing from the   0     No interest on government borrowing from the  0 
    central bank         central bank    
    Central bank prohibited from buying or selling 0.05       Are there taxes for primary market transactions? 0.05   
    Government securities in the primary market?         Yes  1 
    Yes   1     No  0 
      No   0           
 5 Financial Independence 0.16    5 Financial Independence 0.16   
    Determination of the central bank's budget 0.33       Determination of the central bank's budget 0.33   
    Mostly central bank   1     Mostly central bank  1 
    
Mixture of bank and executive or legislative 
branches 
  0.5     Mixture of bank and executive or legislative branches  0.5 
    Mostly executive or legislative branches   0     Mostly executive or legislative branches  0 
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    Determination of  the allocation of bank profits 0.33       Profit/Loss 0.33   
    Mostly by bank or fixed by law   1     Profit  1 
    
Mixture of bank and executive or legislative 
branches   0.5     Loss  0 
    Mostly executive or legislative branches   0          
    Who is responsible for central bank losses 0.33       
How far the actual capital is deviated from the 
limit 0.33   
    Central Bank is fully responsible    1     Higher than limit  1 
    
At certain capital limit, government should 
capitalize the central bank 
  0.5     Less than limit  0 
    Government   0          
                  





Appendix C Details about The Score of Bank Indonesia’s Legal Index 











1 Chief executive officer (CEO)             
  1 a Term of office 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
 
Term of office is 5 years  
Based on Act 13/1953 article 27(3): Governor and Directors shall be appointed by government on proposal of Ministry council (the 
so-called Dewan Moneter) for maximum 5 years.  
Based on Act 13/1968 article 15(3a): Governor and Directors shall be appointed by government on proposal of Ministry council (the 
so-called Dewan Moneter) for maximum 5 years, afterwards may be reappointed.  
Based on Act 23/1999 article 41(5): The member of the Board of Governors shall be appointed for 5 year term of office and may be 
reappointed for the same office at the maximum of one subsequent term of office. 
The Act 3/2004 article 41(5) is the same as the Act 23/1999 article 41(5) 
  2 b Who appoints CEO 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.50 
 
Based on the Act 23/1999 and the Act 3/2004 article 41(1): The Governor and the Senior Deputy Governor shall be nominated and 
appointed by the President upon the approval of Legislature. We interpret the final decision is on the hand of Legislature. Hence, the 
score is increased from 0.25 (based on Act 13/1953 and Act 13/1968) to 0.5 (based on Act 23/1999) 
  3 c Dismissal 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.83 0.83 
 
Based on the Act 13/1953 article 27(6): As a proposal of Dewan Moneter, governor can be dismissed by government. We assigned the 
lowest score since the law did not state clearly about the provision of dismissal.  
Based on the Act 13/1968 article 17(1,2): Governor can be dismissed before the period ends because of dead, activities causing losses, 
particular reason causing a bad performance, resignation. Hence, the score is increased because the law stated in detail about the 
provision for dismissal.  
Based on the Act 23/1999 article 48:  Any member of the Board of Governors shall not be discharged during his/her term of office, 
unless it is conducted upon a resignation of such member, or upon any evidence which proves that such member have committed a 
crime, or permanently prevented from serving his/her office. We do not assign it the highest score 1 but 0.83 because the law still 
stated the provisions of dismissal, which are not related to policy.  
  4 d May CEO hold other offices in government? 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 
 
Based on the Act 13/1953 article 30 (2a): Governor is prohibited from having other positions unless with government’s permission. It 
is given score, 0.5.  
Based on the Act 13/1968 article 18 (2,3): Governor is prohibited from having other position directly or indirectly unless with 
government’s permission. It is also assigned score, 0.5.  
Based on the Act 23/1999 article 47(1): The member of the Board of Governors shall, individually or collectively, be 
prohibited from having any direct or indirect interests on any enterprises; holding any other position concurrently in other entities, 
except his/her tasks require him/her to hold such position; holding a position in the management of and or being a member of a 
political party. Owing to strictly prohibited from holding other positions, hence it is assigned the highest score. 
2 Policy formulation             
  1 a Who formulates monetary policy? 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 1.00 1.00 
 
Based on the Act 13/1953 article 24(3,4) and the Act 13/1968 article 9, 13: Dewan Moneter is responsible for formulating monetary 
policy. In case, there are conflicts in making decision, the government has a final word subject to possible protest by the governor.  It 
can be interpreted that governor participates in policy formulation but has little influence. Hence, the score is 0.67 
Based on the Act 23/ 1999 and the Act 3/2004 article 9(1): other parties shall not interfere with the implementation of the tasks of 
Bank Indonesia. It implies that policy formulation is on the hand of central bank alone 
  2 b Who has final word in resolution of conflict? 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 1.00 1.00 
 
For the Act 13/1953 and the Act 13/1968, the reasons are the same as point (a) above 
Based on the Act 23/ 1999 and the Act 3/2004 article 43(3): The decision making of the meeting of the Board of Governors shall be 
taken through a deliberation to reach an agreement. If such agreement cannot be reached, the Governor shall determine the final 
decision. Therefore, the highest score is assigned.  
  3 c Role in the government's budgetary process 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Both the Act 13/1953 and the Act 13/1968 stated that central bank is government’s cashier. For that reason, central bank has no 
influence.  
Based on the Act 23/1999 and the Act 3/2004 article 54: Bank Indonesia shall provide an opinion and consideration to the Government 
concerning the State Budget and other policies related to the tasks and authority of Bank Indonesia. Yet, central bank has no influence. 
3 Objectives 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.60 0.60 
 
Based on the Act 13/1953 and the Act 13/1968 article 7: The main tasks of Bank Indonesia are to maintain a stability of inflation and 
to create employment. Both objectives are possibly conflicting. Consequently, we assign score, 0.4.  
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Based on the Act 23/1999 and the Act 3/2004 article 7, 8:  The objective of Bank Indonesia is to maintain price stability. Moreover, 
Bank Indonesia also has a task to preserve financial stability by regulating and supervising banking sector. Thus, the score is 
increasing to 0.6.  
4 Limitation on lending to the government             
 
 
      
  1 a Advances (limitation on non-securitized lending) 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.00 1.00 1.00 
 
Based on the Act 13/1953 Article 19(1 and 2): Central Bank has to strengthen government’s budget by providing advances. The limit 
is 30% of government revenue. We assign score 0.67 since central bank is permitted to give advances and the limit is strict.  
Because of the necessities to finance a large budget deficit, in 1955, the maximum limit of credit to the government was revised by the 
Act 11/1955. This law stated that the maximum credit is up to the debt of government to Bank Indonesia reached 7.1 billion rupiah at 
the end of year 1955. The Act 11/1955 was revised again in 1958 by the Act 84/1958. Based on this law, the maximum credit to the 
government is 30 % of government revenue unless in the certain condition this limit is allowed maximum 50 % of government 
revenue. Even the maximum credit to the government increases, but the Act 11/1955 and its revisions stated a strict limitation on 
credits from bank Indonesia to the government. Therefore, the score given to this sub-component is 0.67. 
The Act 13/1968 did not state the limit of credit to the government. In Article 35 (1) just mentioned that the credit to government is 
based the requirement of budget. It indicates that there is no constraint for central bank to give credit for government. Hence, we 
assign the lowest score.  
Based on the Act 23/1999 and the Act 3/2004 Article 56(1): Bank Indonesia shall not provide any credit to the Government. As a 
result, we assigned the highest score.  
  2 b Securitized lending 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.67 
 
Based on the Act 13/1953 Article 18(4) and the Act 13/1968 Article 36, Bank Indonesia was allowed to buy government bonds 
without limitation. Therefore, the lowest score is assigned.  
Based on the Act 23/1999 Article 55(4): Bank Indonesia shall not purchase for itself the state debt securities. It implies central bank is 
independent. 
Based on the Act 3/2004 Article 55(4): Bank Indonesia is prohibited from buying government securities on the primary market for its 
own account, except in the case of short-term government securities needed by Bank Indonesia for monetary control operations. It 
means that Bank Indonesia is permitted to buy government securities in primary market but with a strict limitation, which are only for 
the short-term government securities and for the emergency financing. Therefore, we assign score 0.67 for the securitized lending.  
  3 c Terms of lending (maturity, interest, amount) 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.33 1.00 0.33 
 
Based on the Act 11/1953 Article 19: The lending to government at certain amount is not charged interest. Moreover, as mentioned 
above, amount of credit is limited 30% of government’s revenue. Therefore, it implies that term of central bank’s lending to 
government is specified by the law. The score for this sub-component is 0.67 
Based on the Act 13/1968 Article 35(3): The interest rate on lending is 3% a year, but it can be negotiated by the government and 
Bank Indonesia. It means that the interest rate is stated by the law but still negotiable. Hence, the score of this sub-component 
decreases to 0.33 
Based on the Act 23/1999 Article 56(1): Bank Indonesia shall not provide any credit to the Government. We interpret that term of 
lending is controlled by central bank. Hence, the score is 1.  
Based on the Act 3/2004 Article 55(4): Bank Indonesia is allowed to buy a short term government securities in primary market. 
However, in Article 55(1) states that in the case Government intends to issue government securities, the Government shall hold prior 
consultations with Bank Indonesia. It implies that the term of lending is negotiable between central bank and government. Therefore, 
we assign score 0.33.  
  4 d Potential borrowers from the bank 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Based on the Act 11/1953 Article 15(1): Central government is prohibited to provide credit to other parties. On the other hand, in 
Article 19 states that central bank should strengthen government’s budget by giving advance on demand. It implies that the potential 
borrower of central bank is only the government.  
Based on the Act 13/1968 Article 32(2): Bank Indonesia has a task as a development bank which provides a liquidity credit to public 
and private sectors. For this reason we assign score zero.  
Based on the Act 23/1999 Article 11(1): Bank Indonesia may extend credit or financing based on Syariah Principle to a 
Bank for a maximum period of 90 (ninety) days to overcome its short term financial difficulty (mismatch). The main problem is 
whether private and public sector mentioned in the questionnaire by Cukierman (1992) includes banking sector. We decided to include 
the banking sectors as a public and private sector category. Hence, the potential borrower based on this Act is public and private 
sector, which is given score zero. The same score also assigned for this sub-component based on the Law No. 3/2004.  
  5 e Limits on central bank lending defined in 0.33 1.00 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.00 
 
As already mentioned above, based on the Act 11/1953, there is a maximum limit of central bank credit to the government in term of 
%age of government revenue. Therefore, we assign score 0.33.  
However, the maximum amount of credit is revised by the Law No. 11/1955 in term of currency amount rather than percentage of 
government revenue. By this revision, this sub-component was given the highest score 1.  
The score is back to 0.33 since the Law No. 84/1958 stated the limit of central bank credit in term of percentage of government 
revenue.  
The Act 13/1968 did not state the limit on central bank’s lending. Yet, it is mentioned that the lending is based on budget requirement. 
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At that time, we use balance budget system, hence we decided to assign the lowest score.   
The Act 23/1999 stated that central bank is not allowed to give credits to government. It implies that the limit is on currency with 
amount is zero. Therefore, we assign the highest score.  
The Act 3/2004 does not mention about the limit, therefore we assign score zero.  
  6 f Maturity of loans 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 
 
For the sub-component maturity of loan, we assigned score zero for the Law No. 11/1953, the Law No. 13/1968, and the Law No. 
23/1999 since these laws did not state the maturity of lending. However, because the Law No 3/2004 allowed Bank Indonesia to buy 
the short-run government securities, we interpret the maximum maturity of loans is 1 year. Hence, this sub-component was assigned 
score 0.67.  
  7 g Interest rates on loans must be 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.75 
 
Based on the Act 11/1953 Article 19: The lending to government at certain amount (up to 50 million rupiahs) is not charged interest. It 
implies, the amount of credits higher than the limit will be charged interest, yet not mentioned. Hence, we give score 0.25 for this sub-
component.  
Meanwhile, the Law No. 13/1968 mentioned that the interest on central bank loans is 3% per year but it can be changed by Dewan 
Moneter conditionally. It indicates that Dewan Moneter will charge interest rate lower than market rate. By this interpretation, we 
assign score 0.5 for this sub-component.  
The score of this sub-component decreases to 0.25, since the Law No. 23/1999 did not stated about interest rate of loans. Nevertheless, 
based on the newest Law No. 3/2004, Bank Indonesia is permitted to buy the short-run government securities in primary market. It can 
be interpreted that the interest rate should be paid by the government follows market interest rate. Therefore, the score of this 
component increases to 0.75. 
  8 h Central bank prohibited from buying or selling 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
  
    Government securities in the primary market?             
 
Based on the Act 11/1953 Article 13(4): Central bank is allowed to buy and sell securities in primary market. Hence, the score is zero 
Based on the Act 11/1968 Article 36(2): Central Bank can buy government’s bonds. The score is also zero. 
Based on the Act 23/1999 Article 55(4): Central Bank shall not purchase for itself the state debt securities. Therefore, we assign score 
1.  
Based on the Act 3/2004 Article 55(4): Central Bank may buy government securities on the primary market as part of the provision of 
the emergency financing facility. We assign the lowest score, zero.  
Average Index 0.39 0.41 0.39 0.22 0.75 0.63 
 
 
 
 
